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CHAOS IN FAMILY LAW: A MODEL FOR THE RECOGNITION OF INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
P Bakker 
 
1  Introduction 
 
What is chaos? The Oxford Dictionary
1 defines "chaos" as "complete disorder and 
confusion". There is however a further definition of  "chaos" specifically in the realm 
of  physics.  The  Royal  Society
2  formally  defined  "chaos"  in  1986  as  "stochastic 
behaviour in a deterministic system". A system in chaos is therefore a system that, 
"although displaying apparently random behaviour, has an underlying pattern and 
lawfulness".
3  Chaos  Theory  comes  from  the  observation  that  a  chaotic  system 
appears to be in total disorder, but the theory is really concerned with finding the 
underlying order of the system.
4  
 
Chaotic systems are very sensitive and easily shift from an initially stable condition 
to a chaotic one.
5 In a chaotic system long-term predictions are impossible due to 
the sensitivity of the initial conditions and the shifts from the ordered to the chaotic.
6 
A well-known example of a chaotic system in physics is that of a stream. At first a 
stream is a simple stable system but if the flow of water to the stream is increased it 
can change from the stable to the turbulent to the chaotic.
7 When the flow of water 
reaches a chaotic state it is impossible to predict where a drop of water will be five 
metres downstream. It is, however, possible to predict its general direction of flow.
8  
 
                                                 
   Pieter  Bakker.  BLC,  LLB,  LLD  (UP).  Professor,  Department  of  Private  Law,  UNISA.  E-mail: 
bakkep@unisa.ac.za. This article is based on the author's inaugural lecture delivered on 21 July 
2011 at UNISA, Pretoria. 
1  Oxford University Press 2010 http://www.bit.ly/14ygrWS.  
2   Sterwart Does God Play Dice? 12. 
3   Ayers 1997 T&P 375. 
4   For a discussion of Chaos Theory see Gleick Chaos: Making a New Science. 
5   Ayers 1997 T&P 376. 
6   Ayers 1997 T&P 380; Reynolds 1991 CLR 111. 
7   Ayers 1997 T&P 380; Reynolds 1991 CLR 111-112 uses the example of a dripping faucet. 
8   Ayers 1997 T&P 380; Reynolds 1991 CLR 112. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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Chaos originates from a disorder or complexity on a micro level which can develop 
into  general  trends  on  a  macro  level.
9  The principle of the unpredictability of a 
chaotic system does not apply to general trends.
10  Therefore, even in a chaotic 
system there are trends that can be predicted.
11 The level of analysis is important. 
At a macro level a very complex system can display simple behaviour.  
 
You may ask how Chaos Theory relates to family law. It is true that Chaos Theory 
finds application mainly in physics and mathematics, although it ha s been extended 
to  the  social  sciences  and  applied  in  psychology.
12  It  is  difficult  to  apply  a 
quantitative theory on a qualitative level. I will, however, utilise the theory in a 
metaphorical  manner  to  describe  the  current  state  of  family  law  and  more 
specifically law regulating intimate relationships in South Africa.
13  
 
The law regulating intimate relationships is also known as the  "law of husband and 
wife" or "marriage law". I am of the opinion that these terms do not sufficiently 
describe the current reality in family law. More relationships than merely marriage 
are protected in law. A shift in social parameters occurred when South Africa moved 
away from a dominant minority culture which enforced its perspectives on society to 
a  more  tolerant  society  protecting  the  dignity  and  equality  of  all  cultures  and 
religions. Due to the tolerant nature of our society, more intimate relationships than 
marriage are regarded as worthy of protection in family law.  
 
I will explain the current system of family law with regard to intimate relationships in 
South Africa. When discussing a system the level of focus is important. A system can 
be observed on a macro or micro level, with varying d egrees in between. In a legal 
system, the macro system can be equated to official state recognised law. In a 
                                                 
9   Reynolds  1991  CLR  112;  Knyazeva  Date  Unknown  http://www.bit.ly/13ZP45Q.  The  study  to 
determine order out of chaos is known as "synergetics". 
10   Knyazeva Date Unknown http://www.bit.ly/13ZP45Q. 
11   Ayers 1997 T&P 380. 
12   Ayers 1997 T&P 380. 
13   For chaos as a metaphor of law see Hayes 1991 -1992 UMKC LR 765 and Scott 1993 W&M 331. 
This publication is an exploratory study into the application of chaos to the law of intimate 
relationships.  P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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pluralistic system
14 this level can be regarded as official or state-law pluralism.
15 On 
a macro level we are merely concerned with legislation governing the current law of 
intimate relationships in general and legislative trends  – that is the reaction of the 
state with regard to social demands. On a micro level the interaction between social, 
cultural and religious norms and state-law is investigated. In a pluralistic system this 
can be regarded as deep legal pluralism.
16 The discussion will be on a macro level. 
My  intention  is  to  provide  a  bird 's  eye  view  of  the  law  regulating  intimate 
relationships rather than to investigate all the intricacies on a micro level. It happens 
regularly that we as academics are so involved in investigating a system on a micro 
level that we lose track of the trends developing on a macro level. Perceived random 
results or events on a micro level can generate particular gener al parameters or 
trends on a macro level.
17 
 
I will illustrate why I am of the opinion that the current system of law regulating 
intimate relationships is in a state of chaos. Thereafter changes on the macro level 
are  proposed  that  might  lead  to  a  more  stab le  system  regulating  intimate 
relationships over time. 
 
2  Current state of the law of intimate relationships 
 
Prior to the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, which came into  
operation  on  15  November  2000,  only  one  form  of  intimate  relationship  was 
recognised  -  the  civil  marriage.  The  family  law  system  consisted  merely  of  the 
                                                 
14   Although an analogy is made with reference to pluralism the chaos theory regards the theory of 
pluralism as too linear in its approach. Legal pluralists argue that one can find one or several 
causes which lead to particular legislation. They therefore regard the legislative process as a 
linear and relatively predictable process (Di Lorenzo 1994 YLPR 425-426). A detailed theoretical 
discussion of the chaos theory is beyond the scope of this publication, but see Gleick Making a 
New Science. 
15   State-law pluralism is concerned with at least two legal systems that are recognised within one 
jurisdiction and run parallel to each other with limited interaction. For a discussion on the 
theoretical aspects of legal pluralism see Bakker 2004 THRHR 629; Van Niekerk "Legal Pluralism" 
3-4. 
16   Deep legal pluralism is concerned with the interaction between unofficial cultural or religious law 
and official or state law. In the South African context this would include the interaction between 
the common law and  "living" customary law or religious law s such as Muslim and Hindu law. 
Bakker 2004 THRHR 629; Van Niekerk "Legal Pluralism" 4. 
17   Di Lorenzo 1994 YLPR 431-432. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
119 / 392 
 
Marriage  Act  25  of  1961  and  ancillary  Acts
18  regulating  one  form  of  intim ate 
relationship  which  on  a  macro  level  could  be  regarded  as  a  stable  system  of 
marriage law. On a micro level (that is on a social, cultural and religious level) the 
system appeared more unstable due to the denial of the recognition of religious 
marriages concluded outside the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and the unwillingness to 
recognise indigenous marriages, same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships.
19  
 
The  preamble  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa ,  1996 
acknowledges the diverse nature of the South African population and declares that 
we are "united in our diversity". The Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on 
the  grounds  of  gender,  marital  status,  sexual  orientation,  religion  and  culture, 
amongst others.
20 The Constitution provides the state with the power to promulgate 
legislation recognising marriage in different religious, personal or family law systems 
as far as is compatible with the Bill of Rights.
21  As a direct consequence of the 
prevailing  social  order  and  the  Constitution  a  trend  has  developed  to  protect 
diversity within the South African law.
22  
 
In protecting our diversity and recognising the plurality of our society, more and 
more legislation was generated to protect diverse intimate relationships. The first 
form of intimate relationship to be recognised after the shift in public policy was the 
customary  marriage.  Currently  there  are  three  forms  of  intimate  relationships 
recognised by legislation in South Africa – the civil marriage, the customary marriage 
and  the  civil  union.  Piecemeal  recognition  has  also  been  provided  to  religious 
marriages and domestic partnerships in legislation and by way of court decisions.
23 
                                                 
18   Divorce Act 70 of 1979; Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953; Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 
and Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987. 
19   After the promulgation of the  Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  200 of 1993 
the courts realised that one community cannot impose what it perceives to be correct on another 
community. The court had to impose a policy that is acceptable and representative of the 
community at large. In  Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 960 (C) 707G the court found that an act is 
only contra bonos mores if it "is offensive to those values which are shared by the community at 
large, by all right-thinking people in the community and not only by one section of it." 
20   Section 9(3)-(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21   Section 15(3) of the Constiution. 
22   Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) [54]. 
23   With regard to religious marriage see: ss 1, 2 and 7 of the  Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955; s 10A of 
the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1956; s 195(2) of the  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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I will briefly discuss the different forms of recognised intimate relationships. 
 
2.1  The civil marriage 
 
The civil marriage is a monogamous marriage between parties of the opposite-sex 
concluded through a secular or religious ceremony.
24 The civil marriage is regulated 
by common law and by legislation. The common law definition of a civil marriage 
has, however, been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court for the 
reason that it did not recognise same-sex marriage.
25 Even though the common law 
definition has been altered in the past,
26 the legislature did not amend the definition 
to include same-sex marriage under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 but rather opted 
for an additional Act recognising same-sex marriage - the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.  
 
   
                                                                                                                                                        
1977;  Births  and  Deaths  Registration  Act  51  of  1992;  Domestic  Violence  Act  116  of  1998; 
Children's Act 38 of 2005; Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC); Khan v Khan 
2005 2 SA 272 (T); Singh v Ramparsad 2007 3 SA 445 (D); Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 
(CC); Govender v Ragavayah 2009 3 SA 178 (D). With regard to heterosexual life partnerships 
see: s 21(13) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993. See further Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) where the court 
refused to extend legislation to include opposite-sex life partnerships if the Act did not expressly 
include such life partnerships. In Paixao v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) the common 
law dependant's action was extended to include a partner in a hetero-sexual life partnership.  
With regard to same-sex life partnerships see: Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 
3 SA 312 (T); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 
SA 1 (CC); Farr v Mutual & Federal Insurance 2000 3 SA 684 (C); Satchwell v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs 
2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 
198 (CC); Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 
(CC). The following legislation is applicable to both opposite-sex and same-sex life partnerships: 
Estate  Duty  Act  45  of  1955;  Pension  Funds  Act  24  of  1956;  Maintenance  Act  99  of  1998 
(applicable if parties agreed upon a duty of support); Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
24   "Civil marriage" can be defined as a voluntary union between one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of others; see Heaton South African Family Law 15. The Marriage Act 25 of 1961 draws 
a distinction between "ex-officio marriage officers" and "ministers of religion and other persons 
attached to churches" (ss 2 and 3). 
25   Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
26   Sinclair assisted by Heaton Law of Marriage 307. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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2.2  The civil union 
 
A civil union is similar in nature to a civil marriage with the exception that partners 
of the same sex or opposite sex are allowed to marry under this Act. Partners are at 
liberty to choose to call their union a marriage or a civil partnership.
27 Regardless of 
what they call their relationship the consequences remain the same. The legal 
consequences of a civil union are identical to those of a civil marriage.
28 
 
2.3  The customary marriage 
 
A  customary  marriage  is  a  monogamous  or  polygynous  opposite-sex  marriage 
concluded in terms of indigenous custom.
29 The Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act 120 of 1998 forms the only exception to the strictly monogamous nature of a 
legally recognised South African marriage. A man can enter into a second or further 
customary  marriage  only  after  a  matrimonial  property  contract  regulating  the 
patrimonial  aspects  of  his  future  marriages  is  approved  by  the  court.
30  The 
consequences  of  monogamous  customary  marriages  entered  into  before  the 
promulgation of the Act and all customary marriages concluded after the Act are 
similar to those of a civil marriage.
31 The indigenous law consequences of customary 
marriage  have  been  replaced  with  those  of  the  civil  marriage.  The  only  true 
customary marriage that exists today is a polygynous customary marriage entered 
                                                 
27   A civil union is described as "a voluntary union between two persons who are both 18 years of 
age  or  older,  which  is  solemnised  and  registered  by  way  of  either  a  marriage  or  a  civil 
partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the Act, to the exclusion, while it 
lasts,  of  all  others"  (definition  of  "civil  union"  s  1  of  the  Civil  Union  Act  17  of  2006).    The 
definition of a civil union is similar to that of a civil marriage with the exception that a civil union 
allows for parties of the same-sex to conclude a legally recognised intimate relationship. 
28  Section 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
29   A "customary marriage" is defined in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 as 
"...a marriage concluded in accordance with... the customs and usages traditionally observed 
among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of 
those people" (s 1 definitions of "customary marriage" and "customary law"). 
30   Section 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act  120 of 1998. However, neglect to 
comply with s 7(6) does not affect the validity of the marriages  – see Ngwenyama v Mayelane 
2012 10 BCLR 1071 (SCA). 
31   Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC). P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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into before the coming into operation of the Act.
32 A customary marriage today is 
nothing more than a civil marriage that allows polygyny.
33 Similar to the  Marriage 
Act  25  of  1961  which  allows  for  religious  custom  but  confers  secular  civil 
consequences upon the marriage, the  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act  120 
of 1998 allows for indigenous custom but confers secular civil consequences upon 
the customary marriage.
34 
 
2.4  Religious marriage 
 
Only religious marriages concluded in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or the 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 are currently recognised. Ministers of religion and other 
persons attached to a church can apply to be designated as marriage officers and 
can officiate over religious marriages.
35 Religious marriages performed by a marriage 
officer, including Islamic and Hindu marriages, are, however, registered in terms of 
the Marriage Act  25 of 1961 or  Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. Parties to a religious 
marriage who desire official recognition of their intimate relationship where the 
person officiating over the marriage is not a marriage officer need to conclude a 
further marriage under the  Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or the  Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006. In both instances a dual marriage is created: one marriage with secular 
consequences that are recognised by the state and another that is recognised in the 
religious community.  
 
                                                 
32   Traditional customary law is applicable only to polygynous customary marriages. The Gumede 
decision is applicable only to monogamous customary marriages concluded prior to the coming 
into operation of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.  
33   Bakker 2012 THRHR 155. 
34   The requirements for a valid customary marriage, listed in s 3 of the  Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act  120 of 1998, include that the customary marriage   "must be negotiated and 
entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law," but the patrimonial consequences 
of customary marriages and the consequences upon divorce are regulated by civil law and not 
customary law (ss 7 and 8 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998). 
35   Under the Marriage Act  25 of 1961 a minister of religion or any person holding a responsible 
position in any religious denomination or organization can apply to be designated as a marriage 
officer. This is, however, not possible under the  Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. Now only religious 
denominations or organisations can apply for permission to solemnise marriages and a minister 
or person attached to a religious denomination or organization cannot apply in his/her  personal 
capacity (s 5). P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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The  legislature  has  drafted  the  Muslim  Marriages  Bill  which  intends  to  recognise 
Muslim  marriages.
36  If enacted, the Bill will codify the Islamic law principles of 
marriage. The Bill recognises polygynous marriages but limits such relationships to 
four and a man can marry a second or further wife only with the permission of the 
court.
37  The polygyny restriction clause in the  Muslim Marriages Bill  imposes a 
stricter requirement than the  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
which requires the court merely to approve a contract to regulate future matrimonial 
property.
38  
 
2.5  Domestic partnerships 
 
Domestic partnerships are currently not formally recognised by legislation and can 
be  protected  only  through  other  avenues  of  law  such  as  contract,  universal 
partnerships, estoppel and unjustified enrichment.
39 Prior to the promulgation of the 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 a number of cases conferred spousal benefits on same -
sex life partners which are still applicable in law.
40 These rights were conferred on 
same-sex life partnerships for the reason that same -sex life partners were not in a 
position to enter into a marriage.
41  Although same-sex marriage is now legally 
permissible since the enactment of the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006, same-sex life 
partners can still lay claim to these rights until the position is amended by the 
                                                 
36   GN 37 in GG 33946 of 21 January 2011. The Bill is derived from the draft Bill proposed by the 
South African Law Reform Commission contained in Annexure A to Project 59 Report on Islamic 
Marriages and Related Matters (SALRC Project 59).With regard to the build-up to the Bill, which 
was a long and drawn-out process, and the mixed reaction the Bill received see Moosa Unveiling 
the Mind 145-158. 
37   Clause 8(6) of the Muslim Marriages Bill. 
38   Section 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
39   Heaton South African Family Law 244-247. 
40   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); Farr 
v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2000 3 SA 684 (C); Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development 2003 
2 SA 198 (CC);  J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs  2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC);  Du 
Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC). 
41   Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC) [19]. However, in Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) the 
court held with regard to opposite -sex life partnerships that the law may differentiate between 
married and unmarried persons and withhold spousal benefits from unmarried persons. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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legislature.
42 The result is that same-sex life partners have access to more spousal 
benefits than opposite-sex life partners.
43  
 
A  Draft  Domestic  Partnerships  Bill   proposing  formal  recognition  of  domestic 
partnerships  has  been  published.
44  The  Bill  was  the  result  of  an  investigation 
launched by the South African Law Reform Commission that accumulated into a 
report  proposing  t he  recognition  of  registered  and  unregistered  domestic 
partnerships.
45  The proposal was at first incorporated into chapter 3 of the  Civil 
Union Bill which resulted in the promulgation of the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006.
46 
However chapter 3 was removed by the  Home Affairs Portfolio Committee and not 
included in the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006. A separate bill, the draft  Domestic 
Partnerships Bill was published for comments in 2008. The Bill has as yet not been 
amended or introduced into parliament.
47 
 
3  Hierarchy of marriage  
 
Complications arise from the intricate set of Acts regulating intimate relationships. 
The most obvious complication is that the average person does not know the legal 
consequences of his or her intimate relationship due to the complex system of rules 
applicable  to  intimate  relationships.
48  A further consequence is the creation of a 
hierarchy of intimate relationships in South Africa.
49 This was not the intention of the 
legislature,  which  endeavoured  to  provide  the  same  recognition  to  all  intima te 
relationships, but is a practical consequence of regulating intimate relationships by 
different Acts. The hierarchy refers to a perception that certain intimate relationships 
                                                 
42   Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC) [28]; Smith 2011 SALJ 561. 
43   See Heaton South African Family Law 253-254. 
44   GN 36 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008. 
45   SALRC Project 118. 
46   GN 1275 in GG 29169 of 31 August 2006. 
47   Smith 2011 SALJ 563. 
48   The requirements laid down by the  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act  120 of 1998 are 
simply not followed. Section 7(6) of this Act requires that a man entering into a second or 
further customary marriage should approach   the court for approval of a future matrimonial 
property contract. It seems that even the South African president has not complied with this 
section (Rabkin 2010 http://www.bit.ly/14Zc7gf). 
49   Bakker 2009 JJS 29.   P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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are preferred above others in the social order and therefore enjoy more protection in 
the community and/or law.  
 
The co-existence of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
is problematic. After the Constitutional Court declared the common law definition of 
marriage unconstitutional the legislature opted to draft a separate Act rather than to 
incorporate  same-sex  marriages  into  the  Marriage  Act  25  of  1961.
50  Not 
accommodating  same-sex  marriage  in  the  common  law  definition  of  marriage 
creates the impression that a civil marriage is still the preferred form of in timate 
relationship. The  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006 is, however, not limited to same -sex 
relationships and also allows for opposite-sex civil unions.
51 A civil union is recorded 
in a register separate from that of a civil marriage.
52  Minors are not allowed to 
contract a civil union in accordance with the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, whereas it is 
possible  for  a  minor,  acting  with  the  necessary  assistance,  to  conclude  a  civil 
marriage  under  the  Marriage  Act  25  of  1961.
53  A  bureaucratic  d ifferentiation 
between the two forms of intimate relationships exists. Stricter requirements are set 
for the conclusion of a civil union although the consequences are the same.
54  
 
The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 further provides a choice between a marriage  or a 
civil partnership.
55 Although there is no legal differentiation between the two forms 
of civil unions there is a sociological differentiation.
56 If parties enter into a marriage 
they will call their intimate relationship a "marriage" and the parties to the civil union 
will be known as "spouses". If parties enter into a civil partnership they will call their 
intimate relationship a  "civil partnership" and the parties to the civil union will be 
known as "civil partners". The different terms have specific e stablished sociological 
connotations. A partnership has always been regarded as being of less importance 
                                                 
50   Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
51   Sections 1 and 8(6) of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
52   Section 12 of the Civil Union Act  17 of 2006. 
53   Definition of "civil union" in s 1 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. Minors are allowed to conclude 
customary marriages under the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
54   In terms of s 13 of the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006 the legal consequences of a marriage in 
accordance with the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 are applicable to civil unions. 
55   Section 11(1) of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
56   Bakker 2009 JJS 34-35. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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than  a  marriage.  We  refer  to  "life  partnerships"  where  parties  are  not  formally 
married and the terminology conveys the same message - that the parties are in 
something less than a marriage, although this is not true from a legal perspective.
57 
 
Although the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006 provides a choice of whether the parties 
want to call their union a "marriage" or a "civil partnership"; the title of the Act does 
not contain the word "marriage" but rather "union". The term "union" is customarily 
used in South African family law to refer to a relationship that is less than a 
marriage.  Prior  to  the  recognition  of  customary  marriages  these  intimate 
relationships were referred to as "customary unions" to indicate that the relationship 
did not have the same recognition as that of a civil marriage.
58 The "marriage" in the 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 is grouped with a "civil partnership" and is therefore less 
than a civil marriage by association.
59 
 
Ex officio marriage officers appointed in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 can 
officiate over a marriage in terms of the  Civil Union Act  17 of 2006.
60  Such a 
marriage officer can object on grounds of conscience, religion and belief to conclude 
a civil union between persons of the same-sex.
61  They cannot, however, object with 
regard to opposite-sex civil unions and civil marriages. This creates the impression 
that a same-sex civil union is more objectionable than an opposite-sex civil union or 
                                                 
57   However, see Bilchitz and Judge 2007 SAJHR 484-485, who argue that space is created to form 
different social forms of intimate relationships under the label "civil partnership" as the parties 
may enter into an intimate relationship with consequences similar to those of a marriage, but 
which do not carry the same socially loaded meaning as marriage. A space is therefore created 
for the development of a new social definition of "civil partnership". 
58   Section  35 of the  Black Administration Act  38 of 1972 defines a  "customary union"  as  "the 
association of a man and a woman in a conjugal relationship according to Black law and custom, 
where neither the man nor the woman is party to a subsisting marriage". From the definition it is 
clear  that  a  "customary  union"  is  not  regarded  as  a  marriage  but  merely  as  a  "conjugal 
relationship". The definition has not been repealed and is still applicable within the context of the 
Act. S 57(1) of the  Natal Code of Bantu Law  (Proc R195 in GG 1840 of 8 September 1967 ) 
defined  "customary union"  as  "a civil contract entered into by and between the intending 
partners, subject to the essential requirements of this Code, and end ures until the death of the 
first dying unless earlier dissolved by a competent court of law ". The Natal Code of Bantu Law 
was replaced with  the Natal Code of Zulu Law  (Proc R151 in GG 10966 of 9 October 1987 ) 
whereby  "customary union"  was replaced by  "customary marriage"  (s 36(1)) although the 
description of "customary marriage" remained the same as the description of "customary union" 
in s 57(1) of the Natal Code of Bantu Law. 
59   Section 11 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
60   Definition of "marriage officer" in s 1 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
61   Section 6 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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a civil marriage.
62 A same-sex civil union therefore does not have the same status as 
an opposite-sex civil union.  
 
From the above it is clear that a hierarchy exists among the different forms of 
intimate relationships regulated by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and the Civil Union 
Act  17 of 2006. The civil marr iage is regarded as the more important intimate 
relationship and more worthy of protection, whereafter the civil union follows. A 
"marriage" under the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 is also regarded as carrying more 
status than a "civil partnership". This differentiation might, however, be favourable 
for parties who want the consequences of a marriage but do not want to be 
associated with the traditional concept of marriage, perhaps because they think this 
confines the parties to traditional sexist roles in their relationship.
63 
 
Even though the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 recognises the 
customary  marriage  as  a  valid  marriage,  the  Act  provides  for  a  monogamous 
customary marriage to be converted into a civil marriage.
64 A civil marriage can, 
however, not be converted into a customary marriage. This conveys the message 
that civil marriage is still preferred to customary marriage.  This perception is not 
merely an academic construction. My view can be illustrated by the fa cts of K v P.
65 
The parties were married according to customary law although their marriage was 
invalid due to an existing civil marriage of the man of which the customary  "wife" 
had no knowledge. The defendant promised to marry his customary  "wife" in a civil 
marriage. After the defendant realised his  "wife" was HIV positive he declared that 
she was not worthy of concluding a civil marriage with him. In the defendant's social 
reality a civil marriage had a higher status than a traditional customary marriage , 
even though both forms of marriage enjoy equal protection before the law.
66 
 
                                                 
62   Bilchitz and Judge 2007 SAJHR 490-491; De Vos 2007 SAJHR 462; Bakker 2009 JJS 31. 
63   Bilchitz and Judge 2007 SAJHR 484-485. 
64   Section 10 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
65   K v P [2010] ZAGPJHC 93 (15 October 2010).  
66   See Bakker 2012 THRHR 151-160.   P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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From  the  above  it  can  be  concluded  that  a  hierarchy  of  intimate  relationships 
exists.
67 The civil marriage is at the apex of the hierarchy. The civil union follows. An 
opposite-sex civil union is, however, more acceptable than a same -sex civil union. 
Somewhere between the civil marriage and the civil union the customary marriage 
has  a  form  o f  quasi  existence.  Certain  consequences  of  life  partnerships  are 
recognised similar to those of marriages and this will therefore be the lowest form of 
legally  recognised  relationship.
68  This  currently  includes  religious  marriages  not 
concluded in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
 
4  Possible regulation of intimate relationships 
 
As  is  evident  from  the  above,  the  regulation  of  intimate  relationships  in  a 
multicultural society is problematic. In reaction to protecting diversity and intimate 
relationships within the ambit of the Constitution it is apparent that the legislature 
opted  for  a  model  in  which  different  intimate  relationships  are  regulated  under 
different  Acts.  The  original  intention  was  to  create  equal  parallel  recognition  of 
intimate  relationships.  The  consequence  is  a  myriad  of  problems  associated  with 
inconsistent legal drafting, oversights and complexity. This is the natural reaction of 
a system in chaos. When a calculation is repeated in a chaotic system the result will 
not  be  the  same  due  to  its  dependence  on  the  initial  conditions.
69  The result is 
dependent on time and space.
70 The simple solution to diversity, the recognition of 
diverse intimate relationships through parallel legislation, created a feedback  loop
71 
which generated a more unstable system than the initial unstable system in which 
the legal system recognised only civil marriages and denied diversity. The process of 
a system feeding back into itself can be illustrated with the promulgation of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act  120 of 1998. Initially the intention was for 
the  Act  to  recognise  African  customary  marriages.  However,  a  while  after  the 
                                                 
67   For  more  comprehensive  arguments  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  a  hierarchy  of  intimate 
relationships see Bakker 2009 JJS 42-45.  
68   Heaton South African Family Law 247-252. 
69   Ayers 1997 T&P 380; Reynolds 1991 CLR 111. 
70   Di Lorenzo 1994 YLPR 428. 
71   A  "feedback loop"  is created when the result of an equation is re -entered into the same 
equation. In a chaotic system this will create a random answer within certain parameters, so -
called "strange attractors" (Di Lorenzo 1994 YLPR 431-432).  P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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customary marriage was recognised the constitutionality of certain sections of the 
Act was challenged. Section 7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of  1998  determined  that  the  patrimonial  consequences  of  a  customary  marriage 
entered  into  before  the  coming  into  operation  of  the  Act  was  determined  by 
customary law. In Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa
72 the court 
declared section 7(1) unconstitutional and invalid as far as it related to monogamous 
customary marriages and applied section 7(2) to monogamous customary marriages 
entered into prior to the Act by declaring th e wording  "entered into after the 
commencement of this Act" unconstitutional. However, the court indicated that it 
had a wide discretion in regard to the redistribution of property regardless of when 
the customary marriage was concluded or what the matrimonial property system of 
the  customary  marriage  was.
73  This  application  in  turn  provided  spouses  in 
customary  marriages  with  greater  protection  than  their  counterparts  in  civil 
marriages  and  civil  unions.
74  The  judicial  discretion  to  redistribute  is extremely  
limited with regard to civil marriages and nonexistent in civil unions.
75 This in turn 
might  lead  to  the  extension  of  the  discretion  of  the  court  with  regard  to  the 
redistribution of assets in civil marriages and the application thereof to civil unions if 
challenged,
76 which was definitely not intended by the legislature when the process 
of the recognition of customary marriages was started. Such a development will, 
however, conform with the trend of protecting the rights of vulnerable parties within 
intimate relationships. 
 
The chaotic situation of the law regulating intimate relationships was created by the 
legislature. The Acts merely transferred the complex and often chaotic nature of a 
multi-cultural society on a micro level to the macro level, which in  turn feeds back 
                                                 
72   Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC). 
73   Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) [44]. 
74   Heaton South African Family Law 136. 
75   Section 7(3)–(6) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 empowers the court to make a redistribution 
order. Such an order can be made only if the parties are married with complete separation of 
property and were married prior to the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984 or the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988. Although the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 applies to civil unions, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 was promulgated 
after the commencement of the aforementioned Acts and redistribution is therefore not possible 
(Heaton South African Family Law 201). 
76   Heaton South African Family Law 136-137. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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into the micro system, creating further instability or unpredictability. The state reacts 
to change at a micro level by merely transferring it to a macro level. Where the need 
arises for the recognition of intimate relationships, the legislature merely creates a 
new Act to accommodate those relationships. To create a more stable system on a 
macro  level  the  legislature  should  encapsulate  the  general  predictable  trends 
between the different cultures and religions in legislation within the constitutional 
framework.  The  most  apparent  trend  with  regard  to  intimate  relationships  is  the 
need to recognise the autonomy of persons to choose the nature of their intimate 
relationships and to determine the consequences thereof.
77  
 
Intimate relationship legislation needs to be re-evaluated. The current regulation of 
intimate  relationships  is  unsatisfactory.  There  are  too  many  Acts  with  different 
procedures, a situation which creates legal uncertainty. It is further unacceptable to 
have  a  hierarchy  of  intima te  relationships  with  the  civil  marriage  as  the  most 
acceptable form of intimate relationship. A hierarchy of intimate relationships does 
not recognise diversity but rather weighs relationships against Christian and Western 
norms. Such a yardstick is not a cceptable in a society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. An interesting phenomenon is that in  most international 
human rights instruments it is not marriage as an institution that is protected but 
rather the family as the basic unit of society.
78 The legislature should move away 
from the common law concept of marriage as the norm. The ideal solution would 
therefore  not  be  to  determine  what  can  be  done  to  protect  the  institution  of 
marriage but rather what would best protect the family unit.
79 
 
What are the alternatives? Can we simply deregulate marriage and allow individuals 
to regulate their own intimate relationships by contract, or should the state be 
involved in the regulation of intimate relationships? 
                                                 
77   This is apparent from the number of case law in this regard. See para 2 of this contribution. 
78   Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981); a 10 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); a 23 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
79   Australia has moved away from determining the consequences of a relationship based on the 
ceremony of marriage but rather looks at a relationship of interdependence between the parties. 
Parties can enter into a binding financial agreement before, after or  during separation to opt out 
of the prescribed financial consequences (see Witzleb 2011 IJLPF 143). P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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5  Intimate relationships and contract 
 
At first glance the most pragmatic option would seem to be to get rid of the current 
system  in  its  entirety.  Deregulate  all  intimate  relationships,  remove  state 
involvement and leave the regulation of intimate relationships to individuals in their 
private sphere. 
 
In  South  Africa  the  consequences  of  marriage  are  currently  determined  both  by 
status and by contract.
80 There is a difference between the variable consequences 
negotiated individually and the invariable consequences determined by the state. 
The economic consequences of intimate relationships are increasingly regulated by 
contract.
81 There is a trend in South Africa to provide parties with larger autonomy 
to determine the consequences of their relationship.
82  
 
Parties in a civil marriage, customary marriage or civil union are allowed to conclude 
an antenuptial contract to regulate the variable consequences of  their marriage. 
They are free to contract anything in relation to their relationship provided it is not 
illegal, immoral, impossible or contrary to the nature of marriage.
83 In practice the 
antenuptial contract is, however, usually used only to determine th e matrimonial 
property system of the parties.
84  
 
It is accepted practice for divorcing parties to enter into a settlement agreement 
upon divorce. They are free to contract the consequences of their divorce in such an 
                                                 
80   Consequences based on status are determined by the state and are applicable to all intimate 
relationships, whereas consequences based on contract are individually negotiated by the parties 
to an intimate relationship (Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 880). 
81   Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 889. 
82   Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 880. Bonthuys argues that family law rules should be based on status or 
universal human rights norms rather than cont ract. She argues that the current contract law 
cannot deliver justice in intimate relationships. 
83   Heaton South African Family Law 88; Ex parte Wismer 1950 2 SA 195 (C). 
84   Sinclair "Marriage" 195. Antenuptial contracts are binding between the parties eve n if they are 
not in writing. The contract can, however, be enforced against third parties only if the contract is 
attested by a notary and registered in the deeds registry within three months  date of marriage 
(s 87(7) of the  Deeds Registration Act 47 of 1937). It is interesting to note that even though 
such strict requirements are set to protect third parties, spouses may, as stated in the main text 
above,  disregard  their  antenuptial  contracts  when  concluding  settlement  agreements  upon 
divorce. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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agreement.
85 Any provision can be included in the settlement agreement if it is not 
illegal,  contra bonos mores  or impossible. The parties may even disregard their 
antenuptial contract when concluding a settlement agreement at divorce. Parties do 
however not have full autonomy with regard to set tlement agreements. The courts 
do not have to endorse a settlement agreement but have a discretion to make an 
order in accordance with a settlement agreement.
86 Children are protected by the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 and the  Children's Act 38 of 2005 and an or der of court 
should be made in the best interests of the child.
87  
 
Islamic marriages not concluded in  terms of the  Marriage Act  25 of 1961 are 
currently  regulated  purely  by  contract.
88  At  first  the  Islamic  marriage  contract 
(nikah) was not enforceable due t o the potentially polygynous nature of such a 
marriage.
89 After the decisions in Ryland v Edros
90 and Hassam v Jacobs
91 it is highly 
unlikely that courts will not enforce such a contract.
92  
 
Contractual regulation of intimate relationships is not unfamiliar i n our law. Writers 
arguing for the regulation of intimate relationships by contract regard a contractual 
approach to intimate relationships as beneficial, as such an approach honours party 
                                                 
85   Section 7(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
86   Rowe v Rowe 1997 4 SA 160 (SCA). The court can approve only part of the agreement (Heaton 
South African Family Law 123). 
87   Section  6(1)(a) of the  Divorce Act 70 of 1979. The family advocate assists in determining if  
orders will be in favour of the children. Although the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 
of  1987  does  not  provide  for  mediation  by  family  advocates  it  seems  that  mediation  is 
encouraged where the courts deal with children. In Kotze v Kotze 2003 3 SA 628 (T) the parties 
had agreed in their settlement agreement that the child would belong to a particular faith and 
participate in all of the church 's activities. The court found that such a clause would infringe 
upon the child's right to freedom of religion.  
88   Islamic marriages are based on contract rather than sacrament ( Amod v Multilateral Motor 
Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) para 14; Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 960 (C) 698I-
J). 
89  Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
90   Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C). 
91   Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC). 
92   In Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 960 (C) an Islamic marriage contract was enforced where the 
parties were married in a monogamous Muslim marriage. The decision was a Cape Provincial 
decision (now the Western Cape High Court). It is, however, improbable that other courts would 
not enforce such a contract. In the light of  Hassam v Jacobs, where the Constitutional Court 
found the exclusion of polygynous spouses from the  Intestate Succession Act   81 of  1987 
unconstitutional, it is doubtful that courts would not enforce a marriage contract based on the 
principle that the marriage is  de facto  polygynous. The  Children's Act  38 of 2005 is also 
applicable to religious marriages and will limit the parties' autonomy to contract. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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autonomy and creates finality and legal certainty in family matters.
93 Those opposed 
thereto criticise a contractual approach for upholding unfair contracts rather than 
risking future uncertainty and conflict.
94 The argument is based on the premise that 
parties are never truly equals in  an intimate relationship. One party i s usually 
financially  or  emotionally  weaker  than  the  other  or  under  religious  or  cultural 
pressure.
95 In this sense one party will always influence the other and there will 
never be equal bargaining power between the parties. 
 
Further criticism in regulating intimate relationships by contract is that the parties do 
not foresee the termination of their relationship, not merely due to optimism that the 
relationship  will  not  end,  but  due  to  there  being  too  many  unforeseeable 
contingencies in a long-term relationship that can change the dynamics between the 
parties.
96  If termination is indeed considered, the parties usually think the other 
party will act honourably, and therefore do not include protection in the agreement 
should the relationship be terminated.
97   
 
Contractual freedom is important to provide parties with autonomy with regard to 
the regulation of their personal lives according to their culture, religion and belief. 
The right to freedom of conscience, religion and belief
98 can be honoured only by 
providing autonomy in decisions regarding intimate relationships. However the right 
to equality and dignity and the promotion of the best interest of the child necessitate 
state interference in certain circumstance to honour the rights of vulnerable parties. 
Even though contract law promotes the freedom to contract by the individual in 
intimate relationships, there remains a public interest with regard to the best interest 
                                                 
93   See Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 895 for a discussion of the arguments for the regulation of intimate 
relationships by contract. 
94   Heaton 2005 SAJHR 556; Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 895; Sinclair assisted by Heaton Law of Marriage 
145-146. 
95   The system a person marries under is usually determined by the community he or she lives in 
rather than by a conscious choice between different intimate relationships ( Daniels v Campbell 
2003 9 BCLR 969 (C) 991D-E). 
96   Heaton 2005 SAJHR 554. 
97   Heaton 2005 SAJHR 554; Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 895. The object of a family contract is different 
from that of a commercial contract where the parties merely want to make a profit. Due to the 
particular relationships between the parties in a family, good faith and trust play a  larger role 
than in commercial contracts (see Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 895). 
98   Section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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of the children and the maintenance of indigent family members.
99 Therefore it is of 
the utmost importance that the courts are still involved in the termination of intimate 
relationships, even in systems where the parties can determine the consequences of 
termination by settlement agreement.
100 Although intimate relationship contracts are 
commonly used, intimate relationships cannot be regulated purely by contract. The 
Constitution dictates that there should be state involvement in issues regarding the 
rights  of  the  child  and  the  promotion  of  eq uality.  The  regulation  of  intimate 
relationships only by contract can therefore not be used as a model to simplify the 
law of intimate relationships. Mere deregulation does not pose a possible solution to 
the current system. A balance between status and contract is required.  
 
Another option for creating a more stable system regulating intimate relationships is 
to reduce the existing legislation that regulates such relationships. 
 
6  An alternative model for the recognition of intimate relationships 
 
The Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill is of particular interest in this regard.
101 The 
Draft Bill proposes a more informal form of intimate relationship  –  the  domestic 
partnership.  A  domestic  partnership  can  be  unregistered  or  registered.
102  The 
difference  between  the   two  forms  of  domestic  partnerships  are  that  certain 
consequences  similar  to  marriage  will  be  conferred  on  the  parties  either 
automatically – in the instance of a registered domestic partnership
103 - or by court 
order on application by one of the parties upon the termination of the relationship in 
the instance of unregistered domestic partnerships.
104 
 
A registered domestic partnership will give rise to certain invariable consequences 
similar to those of a marriage. The partners will owe each other a duty of support in 
accordance with their respective financial means and needs, both partners will have 
                                                 
99   Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 897. 
100   Bonthuys 2004 SALJ 897. 
101   GN 36 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008. 
102   Definition of "domestic partnership" in clause 1 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
103   Clauses 9, 10 and 11 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
104   Clause 26 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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a right to occupy the family home, and there will be limitations on the disposal of 
joint property.
105 However, domestic partners will not be held jointly liable for debts 
incurred  by  one  of  the  domestic  partners  for  the  purchase  of  household 
necessaries.
106 Although the default property regime will be out of community of 
property and the parties will be able to contract to live in community of property, the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 will not be applicable to domestic partnerships. 
This is a serious shortcoming in the Draft Bill.
107 Where spouses in a civil marriage, 
civil union or customary marriage have automatic protection under the  Matrimonial 
Property Act 88 of 1984, domestic partners will need to contract to receive similar 
protection.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  capacity  to  incur  debts  for  household 
necessaries cannot be extended to domestic partners.  
 
Should the Draft Bill be promulgated as an Act, the con sequences of a registered 
domestic  partnership  will  correspond  largely  with  those  of  a  marriage.  Such  a 
position is not unheard of. The Dutch registered domestic partnership has the same 
consequences as marriage.
108 
 
The  Draft  Domestic  Partnerships  Bill   provides  for  contractual  regulation  of  the 
financial consequences of domestic partnerships. Parties to a registered domestic 
partnership  can  conclude  a  domestic  partnership  agreement  regulating  their 
partnership.
109 A domestic partnership agreement will have the same validity against 
                                                 
105   Clauses 9-11 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. Further to the above the presumption of 
paternity will exist where the parties are of opposite sex (clause 17), parties will inherit intestate 
from each other, the surviving partner will be able to claim maintenance from the deceased 
estate,  and  the  parties  will  be  regarded  as  married  spouses  with  regard  to  delictual  liability 
(clauses 19-21). In accordance with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 the father obtains parental 
rights and responsibilities automatically in an opposite-sex relationship if the parties live together 
at the children's conception or birth. The invariable consequences will therefore be similar to 
those of spouses. 
106   The capacity is based on a common law principle but is currently regulated by sections 17(5) and 
23 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. The requirements for such a capacity are a valid 
marriage and joint household (Excell v Douglas 1924 CPD 472). However, the other spouse can 
be estopped or held responsible by implied agency (Sinclair assisted by Heaton  Law of Marriage 
447). 
107   Smith 2010 PER 280. 
108   Section 80b Burgerlijke Wetboek Boek 1. 
109   Clause  8  of  the  Draft  Domestic  Partnership  Bill .  Although  registered  domestic  partnership 
agreements are subject to the normal principles of contract law, the courts have a  discretion not P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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third parties on registration as an antenuptial contract, even though it will not have 
to be attested by a notary or registered in the deeds registry.
110  
 
Domestic partnerships can be terminated by agreement.
111 A marriage or civil union 
on the other hand can be dissolved only by court order.
112  Registered domestic 
partners will be able to register a termination agreement to regulate the financial 
consequences of the termination of their intimate relationship.
113 A court order is 
required  to  terminate  a  registered  domestic  partnership  where  children  are 
involved.
114 The procedure enables the court to determine if the parties had regard 
to the best interests of the child. A wide discretion is afforded to the court in 
proceedings regarding the division of property. The court will be able to deviate from 
the  domestic  partnership  agreement  if  such  an  agreement  will  cause  serious 
injustice.
115 The domestic partner in a weaker bargaining position will be in a far 
better position than a civil marriage sp ouse or civil union spouse or civil partner in 
the  same  situation,  as  the  courts  tend  to  hold  spouses  to  their  antenuptial 
agreements in the absence of settlement agreements. The question of whether or 
not the contract might lead to injustice is irrelevant.
116 
 
A registered domestic partner can apply for a maintenance order after termination of 
the domestic partnership.
117 Such an application will be possible even if no provision 
was made for maintenance upon termination of the domestic partnership.
118 The 
domestic partner will once again be in a better position after termination of the 
partnership than a married person after divorce: In a marriage the duty of support 
                                                                                                                                                        
to  enforce  the  agreement  if  the  domestic  partnership  agreement  will  cause  serious  injustice 
(clause 8(2)). 
110   Clause 7 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
111  Clause 12(1) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
112   Section 3 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
113   Clause 14 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
114   Clause 15 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. The court can grant a termination order only if 
the best interests of the children have been duly met (clause 16). The court can appoint a family 
advocate to investigate the situation in terms of the  Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 
of 1987. The court may make any order it deems fit with regard to the best interest of minor 
children. 
115   Clause 8 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
116   Heaton 2005 SAJHR 553-557. 
117   Clause 18 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
118   Clause 18(1) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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terminates  upon  divorce  and  the  court  cannot  award  maintenance  to  a  former 
spouse after the marriage has been terminated by divorce. A new duty of support 
can be created only through a settlement agreement or a maintenance order upon 
divorce.
119 
 
Where there is a dispute regarding the division of joint or separate property after 
termination of a registered domestic partnership, one or both parties will be able to 
approach the court for an order that is just and equitable.
120 The division of property 
will not be limited to the division at the time of termination, but the parties will be 
able to approach the court within a two-year period after termination.
121 The court 
will be empowered to make any order it deems just and equitable.
122  
 
The redistribution of assets will be possible. Separate property can be transferred to 
the  partner  who  made  a  direc t  or  indirect  contribution  to  the  maintenance  or 
increase of the separate property of the other partner.
123 The redistribution clause 
provides a wide discretion to the court. Redistribution can be ordered regardless of 
the parties' property regime. Redistribution is currently not available to parties in civil 
unions  and  is  very  limited  in  the  case  of  civil  marriages.
124  Redistribution  is 
nevertheless possible in customary marriages regardless of the matrimonial property 
regime.
125  
 
Third parties will be protected under the Draft Bill. A court will be able to make any 
order to protect interests of third parties or parties with vested rights in property.
126 
                                                 
119   Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
120   Clause 22 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
121   Clause 23 of the  Draft Domestic Partnership Bill . The court may grant leave to apply after 2 
years if it is convinced that greater hardship will be caused if leave is not granted. 
122   Clause 22(2) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
123   Clause 22(3) and (5) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
124   See para 4 of this contribution.  
125   Section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 empowers the court 
to make a redistribution. In the wake of  Gumede v President of the Rep ublic of South Africa 
2009 3 SA 152 (CC) [44], redistribution is applicable to all customary marriages regardless of 
when the marriage was concluded or what the matrimonial property regime is. S 8(4)(b) further 
empowers the court to make  "any equitable order it deems just "  upon the dissolution of a 
polygynous customary marriage. The court therefore has a wide discretion in making an order 
upon divorce.  
126   Clause 24 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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On termination, notice will have to be provided to interested parties by the domestic 
partners or the executor of the estate.
127 
 
The second form of intimate relationship that will be recognised under the Draft Bill 
is  the  unregistered  domestic  partnership.  Such  a  relationship  will  be  formed 
informally and  dissolved by the separation of  the parties. No  consequences o f 
marriage will automatically be granted or recognised in such a relationship. The 
party who after dissolution of the unregistered partnership through separation or 
death feels that he or she is entitled to maintenance, the division of property, or 
inheritance from the deceased partner's intestate estate will need to approach the 
court for an order in this regard.
128 The court will have to determine every case with 
regard to the facts.
129  
 
The Draft Bill therefore provides for two different forms of intimate r elationships: 
one where the parties make a conscious effort to register and obtain consequences 
similar to those of marriage and another that has no such consequences but where 
an aggrieved party can apply  ex post facto  for such consequences, which will be  
granted only if the facts clearly dictate that  it is proper in the circumstances and if 
any additional relief-specific conditions imposed by the Bill are complied with. The 
choice between registered and unregistered domestic partnerships complies with the 
approach that the consequences of marriage should not be imposed on domestic 
partners as they should be provided with the freedom to choose the consequences 
of  their  relationship  without  the  state 's  imposing  consequences.  An  option  to 
approach the court will, however, protect the vulnerable party in the relationship, 
who might have wanted such consequences but was denied them due to the other 
partner's  stronger  bargaining  position.  Although  the  freedom  of  choice  of  the 
dominant partner will be denied in su ch an instance, this is sometimes required to 
provide for substantive equality. Consequences similar to those of marriage will, 
however, be granted only if the surrounding circumstances dictate this. 
 
                                                 
127   Clause 24 of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
128   Clause 28(1) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
129   Clause 26(2) of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
139 / 392 
 
What  is  interesting  about  the  registered  domestic  partnership  is  that  the 
consequences  are  similar  to  those  of  a  marriage,  although  the  conclusion  and 
termination of such a partnership are less formal than those of a marriage. The 
parties will be in a better position after termination, as an interested party will be 
able to apply for post-divorce maintenance and the division of assets. The court's 
power  to  redistribute  of  assets  will  not  be  as  limited  as  in  the  case  of  a  civil 
marriage. The parties will in fact be in a better position than their counterparts in 
marriage. The importance of the Draft Bill is that it proposes a simplified process of 
regulating the consequences of an intimate relationship and the termination of such 
a  relationship,  while  still  safeguarding  the  interests  of  third  parties,  children  and 
vulnerable parties in domestic partnerships. The Draft Bill will even provide relief 
after the termination of the relationship. 
 
7  Recommendation 
 
There is no reason why different Acts should regulate different intimate relationships 
if the consequences are the same. The Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill provides a 
good starting point to regulate all intimate relationships. The ideal would be to have 
one secular Act regulating all forms of intimate relationships. There should be only 
two  forms  of  intimate  relationships:  registered  and  unregistered.  A  registered 
intimate  relationship  should  be  created  by  mere  registration.  When  registering 
intimate relationships the parties can select what they prefer to call their relationship 
– a marriage, union, partnership or any other name. Such a registered partnership 
can  be  concluded  between  opposite-sex  or  same-sex  parties.  Although  the  Draft 
Domestic  Partnerships  Bill  does  not  provide  for  polygynous  registered  domestic 
partnerships, provision should be made for polygyny where the parties' religion or 
custom  allows  polygyny.
130  Such  an  Act  will  therefore  provide  for  customary 
marriages and religious marriages that allow polygyny. The unregistered intimate 
                                                 
130   It  is  noteworthy  that  although  clauses  4(1)  and  4(2)  of  the  Draft  Domestic  Partnership  Bill 
require  that  registered  domestic  partnerships  be  monogamous,  this  is  not  required  of 
unregistered  domestic  partnerships.  The  court  can,  in  making  an  order  with  regard  to  the 
consequences  of  an  unregistered  domestic  partnership,  have  regard  to  other  existing 
unregistered domestic partnerships and customary marriages of the domestic partners (clause 
28(2)(h)). P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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relationship  will  be  similar  to  the  current  life  partnership.  If  the  relationship  is 
terminated  the  parties  may,  however,  apply  for  protection  similar  to  that  of  the 
registered partnership based on the circumstances of each case. 
 
The  Act  should  contain  all  of  the  minimum  requirements  for  a  valid  intimate 
relationship.  Certain  invariable  consequences  will  be  conferred  on  parties  in  a 
registered  intimate  relationship  similar  to  the  current  consequences  of  a  civil 
marriage.  
 
The Act should contain a set of default intimate relationship agreements regulating 
the  variable  consequences  of  the  relationship  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
intimate  relationship  the  parties  enter  into.  Default  relationship  contracts  will 
regulate the different forms of intimate relationships to ensure substantive equality. 
For  example,  a  default  intimate  relationship  agreement  can  be  created  for  a 
registered intimate relationship in terms of Islamic law, which will cede the right of 
talaq to the female partner and a clause protecting multiple wives or even by default 
excluding polygyny.
131 The parties should have an option to regulate the variable 
consequences of their intimate relationship by contract and should therefore be able 
to opt out of the default contract by registering an intimate relationship contract. 
Currently it is possible to regulate more than the matrimonial property regime in an 
antenuptial contract. The parties will be able for example to determine that Islamic 
law or customary law will be applicable to their marriage. There is a trend to 
increase judicial discretion where part y autonomy is increased in family law.
132 A 
wide  discretion  should  therefore  be  provided  to  the  court  to  deviate  from  a 
relationship contract if it leads to undue hardship. The majority of civil marriages are 
in community of property due to the fact that this is the default matrimonial property 
system and most parties do not enter into an antenuptial contract. This is in all 
probability due to the parties being satisfied with the status quo, due to ignorance of 
the law, or simply because they do not want to go through the process of having an 
                                                 
131   For a discussion of Islamic marriage law principles see Bakker 2010 SJ 66. 
132   In the Netherlands and Germany, parties have a broad contractual capacity to regulate family 
matters. The broader the parties' contractual freedom is in a particular jurisdiction the more this 
allows  for  judicial  capacity  to  determine  that  the  agreement  complies  with  general  legal 
principles and the law in general (Sonnekus 2010 TSAR 58). P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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antenuptial contract drafted. A similar trend will provide protection to the majority of 
partners under the proposed Act.  
 
Due to the personal and emotional nature of intimate relationships our adversarial 
legal system is not sufficiently equipped to deal with the termination of intimate 
relationships.
133 The parties should be able to terminate their relationship by the 
mere registration of a termination agreement. However, where there is a dispute 
regarding  the  consequence s  of  termination,  the  parties  will  have  to  undergo 
compulsory mediation and only if the parties are unable to mediate their differences 
should the matter be referred to court. As in the  Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 
the  termination  of  an  intimate  relat ionship  where  children  are  involved  should 
require a court order. It is advisable that the parties should first draft a termination 
agreement between themselves or through mediation before the matter is referred 
to court.  
 
A wide judicial discretion to de viate from termination agreements should such an 
agreement lead to injustice between the parties or not provide for the best interests 
of the children involved is inevitable. The regulation of termination by contract might 
not always have the equitable out come envisaged, due to the unequal bargaining 
power of the parties or emotional manipulation by one of the parties or by the 
community. The solution to this problem is to empower the parties to approach the 
court after termination of the relationship. 
 
As in the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, provision should be made for a party in an 
unregistered  intimate  relationship  to  approach  the  court  after  dissolution  for 
appropriate relief inter alia for maintenance and the division of property, which will 
be granted only if the facts justify it. Such an approach will protect the parties ' 
autonomy  to  choose  the  consequences  of  their  relationship  without  the  state 's 
imposing  consequences,  while  at  the  same  time  protecting  the  rights  of  the 
vulnerable parties.  
 
                                                 
133   De Jong 2005 TSAR 33. P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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8  Conclusion 
 
Chaos in the law regulating intimate relationships originates on a micro level due to 
social,  religious  and  cultural  diversity.  Prior  to  the  advent  of  the  constitutional 
dispensation,  diversity  in  the  nature  of  the  intimate  relationships  in  which  South 
Africans  were  involved  was  largely  ignored.  The  legislature  has  currently  merely 
transferred the chaos on a micro level to the macro level by enacting legislation as 
the  need  arose  to  recognise  a  new  form  of  intimate  relationship.  The  correct 
approach would be to identify general trends in society and regulate these trends on 
a macro level while providing freedom for the development of the different cultures 
and  religions  on  a  micro  level.  Some  of  the  trends  that  are  apparent  are  the 
development of social tolerance towards diversity, a change in the nature of families, 
an increase in private autonomy, and an increase in consciousness of the plight of 
vulnerable parties in intimate relationships.   
 
Creating  one  secular  Act  that  regulates  intimate  relationships  would  bring  about 
more  legal  certainty  in  the  currently  chaotic  family  law  system.  The  Act  would 
promote diversity by providing the parties with an option to regulate the nature of 
their intimate relationship by contract, and as such would promote private autonomy 
while acknowledging the diverse nature of South African families. Default provisions 
would protect the majority of partners in registered intimate relationships, whereas 
partners in unregistered intimate relationships could rely on the courts to provide 
relief  after  termination  of  the  intimate  relationship.  As  a  consequence  of  the 
regulation  of  different  cultural  and  religious  intimate  relationships  by  one  Act, 
acculturation would take place in the different social, cultural and religious systems, 
and this would over a period of time lead to a more stable system on a micro level. 
 
Chaos Theory can assist in unravelling the current predicament we are facing in our 
multicultural society. We merely need to change our approach. Instead of reacting to 
specific changes in the social order and trying to predict specific outcomes it might 
be  advisable  to  investigate  general  trends  instead.  There  is  order  behind  all  the P BAKKER        PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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apparent  chaos.  We  need  to  determine  what  this  order  consists  of  and  act 
accordingly. 
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